Heap spraying is a technique attackers use to flood an application's heap memory with repeated copies of malicious code so that a memory corruption bug is more likely to jump into attacker-controlled data.
At its core, heap spraying repeatedly allocates memory blocks containing the same payload so that a subsequent, imprecise jump lands within attacker-controlled data.
Attackers typically use scripting environments like JavaScript inside a browser or scripting in document viewers to allocate many objects with the payload, then trigger a memory corruption bug (for example, a use-after-free) that redirects execution into the heap area filled by the attacker.
Heap spraying raises the attackers chance of success by removing the need to know an exact memory address and by working around defenses like ASLR.
Its particularly useful in large-scale attacks where the attacker cannot profile each target machines layout, such as malicious web pages or weaponized documents.
Heap spraying is an exploitation technique used with memory corruption bugs like use-after-free, type confusion, and other flaws that can redirect execution flow to a heap address.
By combining spraying with an exploit that can overwrite a function pointer or return address, attackers turn an otherwise unreliable bug into a reliable code execution path.
Heap spraying was widely used in browser and document-reader attacks in the 2000s and 2010s, including high-profile Internet Explorer and PDF exploits where a single crafted page or file targeted many users.
Those campaigns showed how a single malicious site or document could scale an exploit by relying on heap spraying to hit attacker code across many different systems.
Heap spraying is not itself an overflow; its an aid that increases the chance an exploit will find attacker data, whereas a buffer overflow is a direct memory overwrite that corrupts program data or control flow.
Both techniques can be used together: an attacker may overflow a buffer to redirect execution and use a sprayed heap to ensure the jump lands on their shellcode.
Modern defenses like ASLR, DEP (Data Execution Prevention), and browser mitigations such as same-origin policies make heap spraying harder but not impossible.
Defenders should keep software patched, enable memory protection features, and restrict script execution where possible to reduce the attack surface.
Responders should look for unusual, repeated memory allocations from scripting engines, unusual child processes spawned after web or document access, and abnormal network callbacks from processes that handle untrusted files.
Endpoint telemetry, memory-dump analysis, and monitoring of exploited application logs can reveal the sequence of allocations and the exploit trigger.
Apply software updates, turn on OS-level memory protections, limit untrusted scripting (e.g., disable JavaScript in legacy viewers), and use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to catch abnormal process behavior.
Regular threat-hunting for exploit patterns and targeted patching of memory-corruption vulnerabilities are also effective controls.
Heap spraying is less common in modern web apps with stricter browser sandboxing and mitigation controls, but attackers still use variations of it in targeted exploits against outdated or misconfigured software.
Organizations should prioritize browser and plugin updates and reduce reliance on legacy document viewers that allow broad script execution.
Palisades learning center has resources on memory-based attacks, hardening browsers, and incident response best practices. Visit https://palisade.email/ for more materials and tools.
Yes, it can still work against unpatched or misconfigured systems, but mitigations like ASLR and DEP make successful exploitation harder.
No. While browsers were a common vector, any application that executes untrusted scripts or handles complex file formats (PDF, multimedia) can be targeted.
Disabling JavaScript removes a common spray vector, but attackers can still exploit other scripting interfaces and document-based features; comprehensive hardening is needed.
Look for repeated large allocations, suspicious allocation sizes from processes that handle untrusted content, and subsequent unexpected code execution or network connections.
Contact your security team or external incident response provider and collect endpoint telemetry and memory snapshots; Palisade's resources can guide next steps at https://palisade.email/.